Population pressure produced cooperation and commons regulation, not tragedy

Evidence

But in areas such as Denmark and Norway, where individuals were more isolated and where pastoral husbandry took precedence over the cooperative three-field system, communal ties and organization remained weak. In many regions, therefore, population pressure resulted not in a “tragedy of the commons” produced by competitive self-interest, but in increased cooperative activity and in group regulation of the ecosystem. — Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature, 266

Categorization

• ADDENDUM: This directly complicates Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ framing — a useful counterpoint in any commons/commonsing thread within the polyad, where self-governing commons regimes (echoing Ostrom) show cooperation, not ruin.
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: how did the ‘tragedy of the commons’ thesis interact with Hardin’s eugenicist politics — the same author whose framing is here rebutted by historical evidence?
• XREF: connects to: Cooperative global governance can sustain population growth — Bob Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter, 1725; High stakes and good intentions do not overcome commons coordination failures; Resource scarcity shifts evolutionary success from competition toward cooperation — Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom,…, 1048 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• High stakes and good intentions do not overcome commons coordination failures #contradicts (0.82)
• Resource scarcity shifts evolutionary success from competition toward cooperation #corroborates (0.80) — Robin Wall Kimmerer, Braiding Sweetgrass, 1048
• Cooperative global governance can sustain population growth #expands (0.75) — Bob Altemeyer, The Authoritarian Specter, 1725
• Agricultural subsistence economics structurally suppress cooperation and trust beyond the family #qualifies (0.72) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 470