Political types differ less in beliefs than in relations to those beliefs.

Evidence

In other words, volunteers, activists, and cynics shared a scepticism about the government, but habitually displayed it diĀ”erently. It was not their ā€œinnerā€ beliefs that diĀ”ered so much as their beliefs about how and where to voice some ideas and feelings and not others. Their beliefs were not very diĀ”erent, but their relations to their beliefs were. This relation made diĀ”erent topics more easily discussable, diĀ”erent questions more easily thinkable, diĀ”erent activities more easy to undertake. — Nina Eliasoph, ā€œClose to homeā€, 61

Categorization

  • DEEPTHINKING: The claim that beliefs are less important than one’s relation to them - the performative, contextual handling of belief - reframes political psychology away from inner conviction toward socially situated voicing. Dense enough to sit with.
  • XREF: Connects to Goffman’s dramaturgical self and to ā€˜relational’ accounts of belief, and resonates with the idea in The Reluctant Fundamentalist of identity as situational performance. — connects to: Identical political beliefs can serve different psychological functions; Ideologies discover their subjects rather than subjects belonging inevitably to fixed ideologies. — Hall, Stuart, Essential Essays, Volume 1, 736; Personal and political framing both shrink problems but operate in opposite directions. — Nina Eliasoph, Avoiding politics: how Americans…, 1266 (+2 more)
  • corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Nina Eliasoph, ā€œClose to homeā€: The work of avoiding…, 61

Broader Connections