Political and paternal power are distinct in foundation and end, not the same thing.

Evidence

This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that parents in societies, where they themselves are subjects, retain a power over their children, and have as much right to their subjection, as those who are in the state of nature. Which could not possibly be, if all political power were only paternal, and that in truth they were one and the same thing: for then, all paternal power being in the prince, the subject could naturally have none of it. But these two powers, political and paternal, are so perfectly distinct and separate; are built upon so different foundations, and given to so different ends, that every subject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over his children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has parents, owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the meanest of his subjects do to their’s; and can therefore contain not any part or degree of that kind of dominion, which a prince or magistrate has over his subject. — John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 84

Categorization

• XREF: This is the crux of Locke’s refutation of Filmer’s patriarchal monarchy and of the whole ‘sovereignty by fatherhood’ tradition — core to the course’s consent/government foundations. — connects to: Political liberty means rule by law, not unchecked individual license — John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 30; Early men preferred paternal rule because it protected rather than restrained them. — John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, 89; Political power takes its shape from a distinct rationality, not from social structures — Wendy Brown, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise…, 92 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Dominating differs from leading in whether rulers concord interests with others. #complicates (0.75)
• Political power takes its shape from a distinct rationality, not from social structures #expands (0.70) — Wendy Brown, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism, 92