Policing speech obscures the line between offence, hatred, and violence.

Evidence

To unpack this discussion, we need again to separate out certain distinct categories. We need, in particular, to distinguish between the giving of offence, the promotion of bigotry or hatred, and the incitement of violence. The boundaries between the categories are blurred, and have deliberately been made more so in recent practice and policymaking. The 1986 Public Order Act, for instance, forbids the use of ‘threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, within the hearing and sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby’, a phrasing that conflates offence, hatred and violence. The use of the concept of Islamophobia has helped further erode such distinctions. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 655

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly relevant to the definitional-camps reading purpose: the author charges that the concept of Islamophobia itself erodes legal distinctions — which is the opposite position from the Runnymede racialization camp, which sees Islamophobia as naming a real harm. — connects to: Giving offence and fomenting hatred are morally distinct acts — Runnymede Trust (ed. Farah Elahi & Omar Khan), Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us…, 664; Pluralism is often invoked to justify policing speech about other groups’ beliefs. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 657; Bigoted speech should be countered morally and politically, not legally. — A. Hussain, N. Meer, Framing Muslim Integration, 671 (+2 more)
  • QUESTION: Worth chasing: does the author specify how the Islamophobia concept ‘helped further erode’ these distinctions — through its fuzziness, or through the regulatory responses it invited?

Broader Connections