Phenomena are genuinely in-itself rather than noumenal appearances

Evidence

Aron may have been saying something like this: traditional philosophers often started with abstract axioms or theories, but the German phenomenologists went straight for life as they experienced it, moment to moment. They set aside most of what had kept philosophy going since Plato: puzzles about whether things are real or how we can know anything for certain about them. Instead, they pointed out that any philosopher who asks these questions is already thrown into a world filled with things — or, at least, filled with the appearances of things, or ‘phenomena’ (from the Greek word meaning ‘things that appear’). So why not concentrate on the encounter with phenomena and ignore the rest? The old puzzles need not be ruled out forever, but they can be put in brackets, as it were, so that philosophers can deal with more down-to-earth matters. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 11 (#responds-to, via linked claim)

The original presence of the for-itself is presence to being. Shall we say then that it is presence to all being? That would be to fall back into our former error. For totality can come to being only by the for-itself. A totality indeed supposes an internal relation of being between the terms of a quasi-multiplicity in the same way that a multiplicity supposes—in order to be this multiplicity—an inner totalizing relation among its elements. In this sense addition itself is a synthetic act. Totality can come to beings only by a being which has to be its own totality in their presence. This is precisely the case with the for-itself, a detotalized totality which temporalizes itself in a perpetual incompleteness. It is the for-itself in its presence to being which causes there to be an all of being. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 585 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The being of phenomena is not a hidden noumenal world behind them — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 153; The In-itself’s full being makes the emergence of consciousness inexplicable; Totality of being arises only through the detotalized for-itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 585 (+6 more)

Broader Connections

• The In-itself’s full being makes the emergence of consciousness inexplicable #complicates (0.85)
• Totality of being arises only through the detotalized for-itself #corroborates (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 585
• Phenomenology investigates direct experience of phenomena rather than questions of reality #responds-to (0.80) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 11
• Consciousness transcends toward the meaning of being, not being itself #expands (0.75) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 154
• The in-itself and for-itself are two radically separated regions of being #qualifies (0.75)