Personal and external control are interchangeable ways of warding off perceived randomness.

Evidence

Control theorists have long posited that the desire to perceive control (i.e., influence) over one’s social environments and outcomes constitutes a primary and fundamental motivating force in human life (deCharms, 1983; Kelley, 1971; White, 1959). More recently, the compensatory control model proposed that this desire has its roots in a more basic and inclusive motivation to defend against perceptions of randomness and chaos in the environment (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009). Put differently, this model traces people’s control strivings to the need to perceive order or structure, thus preventing unsettling perceptions of randomness. Importantly, this reasoning implies that personal control (i.e., perceiving the self as in control) and external control (i.e., perceiving external systems, such as the cultural ingroup, as in control), are interchangeable means of preserving a desired level of perceived order (vs. randomness) in the environment (Shepherd, Kay, Landau, & Keefer, 2011). — Dmitrij Agroskin and Eva Jonas, Controlling death by defending ingroups, 21

Categorization

• XREF: Coresonates directly with terror management theory’s claim that cultural worldviews buffer death anxiety — both treat distal systems as interchangeable psychological services; relevant to the reader’s test of hollowed-out group identities. — connects to: Risk-control models based on mild randomness can generate the wild randomness they deny — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial…, 1168; Self-control is maintained socially, through others, not only individually — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 331; Subjection can maximize a person’s expected freedom from interference while leaving them vulnerable. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 422 (+8 more)
• QUESTION: If personal and external control are interchangeable, what happens when the external system (a group) offers order but its affirmative content is gone — does the boundary-fortification still function as ‘perceived order’?
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Dmitrij Agroskin and Eva Jonas, Controlling death by defending…, 21

Broader Connections

• Personalized control and institutional measures equally produce rather than replace trust #corroborates (0.88)
• People can will future actions indirectly by engineering external stimuli that trigger internal responses #expands (0.85) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 229
• Self-control is maintained socially, through others, not only individually #qualifies (0.82) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 331
• Freedom of choice can itself serve domination when options are controlled. #complicates (0.79) — Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 121
• Risk-control models based on mild randomness can generate the wild randomness they deny #complicates (0.78) — Donald MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera, 1168
• Providing attractive alternatives beats prohibiting unwanted behavior. #exemplifies (0.77)
• Controlling attention is more effective than banning options #exemplifies (0.74) — Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants, 421
• Diffuse, indirect harm escapes personal moral control more easily #qualifies (0.73)
• Subjection can maximize a person’s expected freedom from interference while leaving them vulnerable. #complicates (0.72) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 422
• High self-esteem buffers against the need for external control. #complicates (0.72) — Dmitrij Agroskin and Eva Jonas, Controlling death by defending ingroups, 129
• People use small self-imposed constraints to avoid confronting their freedom #complicates (0.71) — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist Café, 504