Perpetrator identity shifts victim assessment through moral disengagement, most among glorifiers

Evidence

The same measure was used in a recent study that I conducted together with Bernhard Leidner and Patrycja Slawuta, which focused on the ongoing war in Iraq. We presented our participants with an alleged newspaper article that discussed a case very similar to the Abu-Ghraib scandal, in which US personnel (versus Iraqi themselves, in another experimental condition), were responsible for the torturing and eventual death of several Iraqi prisoners. After participants had read the article, we measured attachment to and glorification of the USA, we asked participants to indicate the extent to which they experienced a series of emotions when learning about the events, and we asked them to estimate to what extent the family members of the victims experienced a series of negative emotions. Furthermore, we measured explicit dehumanization of the victims group, and asked them about punishment of the perpetrators and reparations to the victims. The goal was to empirically test a model in which moral disengagement strategies (minimizing the negative emotions experienced by the victims’ family members and dehumanizing them) mediated the effect of in-group identification on support for different forms of justice (punishment and reparations). … The outcome of this investigation conveys two important messages. First, the identity of the perpetrator (in-group versus out-group) makes a difference in the assessment of the victims and their suffering, with in-group perpetrators leading to more defensive responses, particularly among high in-group glorifiers. — Emanuele Castano, On the Perils of Glorifying the In-group, 50

Categorization

• XREF: Describes the Iraq experiment design (Abu-Ghraib-like scenario, US vs Iraqi perpetrator, measuring minimization of victim suffering, dehumanization, and justice preferences) — the reader’s stated purpose is to cross-check this against Leidner et al.’s three-study finding on the same glorification threshold variable. — connects to: Shared identity with the perpetrator is the critical precondition for moral disengagement — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2112; Adopting the perpetrator’s perspective reverses which identifiers feel most guilty — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 1065; Imagining the perpetrator’s viewpoint raises guilt only in low identifiers — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt: International…, 1061 (+2 more)
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: how does this in-group/out-group perpetrator experiment relate to the threshold between attachment and glorification found by Leidner et al.?
• ADDENDUM: Directly supports the reader’s stated purpose: cross-checking this Iraq-experiment measure against Leidner et al.’s three-study glorification findings.

Broader Connections

• Shared identity with the perpetrator is the critical precondition for moral disengagement #qualifies (0.85) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2112
• Adopting the perpetrator’s perspective reverses which identifiers feel most guilty #corroborates (0.80) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 1065
• Imagining the perpetrator’s viewpoint raises guilt only in low identifiers #qualifies (0.78) — Nyla R. Branscombe and Bertjan Doosje (eds.), Collective Guilt, 1061
• Threat to in-group moral image triggers defensive reinterpretation of atrocity reports. #expands (0.75) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 2136