Permanence is identical with abstractness, both rooted in the for-itself’s negation

Evidence

Concerning the For-itself as such we should never say, “It is” in the sense that we say, for example, “It is nine o’clock;” that is, in the sense of the total equivalence of being with itself which posits and suppresses the self and which gives the external aspect of passivity. For the For-itself has the existence of an appearance coupled with a witness of a reflection which refers to a reflecting without there being any object of which the reflection would be the reflection. The For-itself does not have being because its being is always at a distance: its being is there in the reflecting, if you consider appearance, which is appearance or reflection only for the reflecting; it is there in the reflection if you consider the reflecting, which is no longer in itself anything more than a pure function of reflecting this reflection. Furthermore in itself the For-itself is not being, for it makes itself be explicitly for-itself as not being being. It is consciousness of —— as the internal negation of ——. The structure at the basis of intentionality and of selfness is the negation, which is the internal relation of the For-itself to the thing. The For-itself constitutes itself outside in terms of the thing as the negation of that thing; thus its first relation with being-in-itself is negation. It “is” in the mode of the For-itself; that is, as a separated existent inasmuch as it reveals itself as not being being. It doubly escapes being, by an internal disintegration and by express negation. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445 (#expands, via linked claim)

Thus the pure green comes to the “green-roughness-light” on the ground of the future as its meaning. We apprehend here the meaning of what we have called abstraction. The existent does not possess its essence as a present quality. It is even the negation of essence; the green never is green. But the essence comes from the ground of the future to the existent, as a meaning which is never given and which forever haunts it. It is the pure correlate of the pure ideality of my negation. In this sense there is no such thing as an operation of abstraction if we mean by that a psychological affirmative act of selection effected by a constituted mind. Far from abstracting certain qualities in terms of things, we must on the contrary view abstraction as the original mode of being of the for-itself, necessary in order that there may be, in general, things and a world. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 607 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

The thing, before all comparison, before all construction, is that which is present to consciousness as not being consciousness. The original relation of presence as the foundation of knowledge is negative. But as negation comes to the world by means of the for-itself, and as the thing is what it is in the absolute indifference of identity, it can not be the thing which is posited as not being the for-itself. Negation comes from the for-itself. We should not conceive this negation as a type of judgment which would bear on the thing itself and deny concerning it that it is the for-itself; this type of negation could be conceived only if the for-itself were a substance already fully formed, and even in that case it could emanate only as a third being establishing from outside a negative relation between two beings. But by the original negation the for-itself constitutes itself as not being the thing. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 571 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: For the for-itself, permanence is what needs explaining, not change — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 498; The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 445; The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 571 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• The For-itself’s being consists in internal negation rather than self-coincidence #expands (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 445
• Abstraction is the for-itself’s original mode of being, not a mental act #corroborates (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 607
• The for-itself constitutes itself through an original negation of the thing #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 571