Perfect scientific neutrality is elusive and possibly undesirable when moral values are at stake

Evidence

There are live controversies and unresolved issues—plenty of work for future generations of political psychologists to complete. One perennial question is whether drawing on one’s own political values and ideological convictions can help to produce valid scientific insight, or whether this inevitably leads to distortion and bias. Tetlock (1994), for instance, argued that “the road to scientific hell is paved with good moral intentions” and complained that (predominantly liberal) social scientists have too often allowed their own personal views to influence their professional analyses of racism and other value-laden topics. To these charges, Sears (1994) replied that being explicit about one’s theoretical and political preferences is “far healthier than cloaking our own feelings in a pretense of scientific objectivity, while ignoring a ream of scientific evidence we happen to find distasteful” (p. 555). To be sure, when moral and political values are at stake, perfect neutrality is elusive. But to what extent is it even desirable as an ideal goal? The reader will have to answer this thorny question for himself or herself. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 93

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to reader’s ongoing question about whether ironic/strategic identity claims — in this case, value-laden scientific analysis — can be held without collapse; echoes Spivak’s own hedging about strategic essentialism and the reflexivity of critical positions. — connects to: Perfect neutrality in politically charged science is elusive and possibly undesirable — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 93; Science’s value-freedom dismantled normative barriers to genocidal co-operation — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 315; Scientific neutrality is itself metaphysical and masks domination — Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 43
  • QUESTION: The debatability of neutrality-as-ideal echoes whether strategic essentialism requires posturing neutrality about one’s own essentialist commitments — worth chasing whether Tetlock/Sears frame maps onto the essentialism debate.

Broader Connections