Perfect neutrality in politically charged science is elusive and possibly undesirable

Evidence

One perennial question is whether drawing on one’s own political values and ideological convictions can help to produce valid scientific insight, or whether this inevitably leads to distortion and bias. Tetlock (1994), for instance, argued that “the road to scientific hell is paved with good moral intentions” and complained that (predominantly liberal) social scientists have too often allowed their own personal views to influence their professional analyses of racism and other value-laden topics. To these charges, Sears (1994) replied that being explicit about one’s theoretical and political preferences is “far healthier than cloaking our own feelings in a pretense of scientific objectivity, while ignoring a ream of scientific evidence we happen to find distasteful” (p. 555). To be sure, when moral and political values are at stake, perfect neutrality is elusive. But to what extent is it even desirable as an ideal goal? — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 93

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the epistemic humility/standpoint debates already in the reader’s library (feminist standpoint theory rejecting neutrality). — connects to: Scientific neutrality is itself metaphysical and masks domination — Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 43; Nobel Prizes reflect disciplinary politics and local context, not pure scientific merit — Dieter Plehwe, Quinn Slobodian & Philip Mirowski (eds.), Nine Lives of Neoliberalism, 480; Liberal neutrality masks power by presenting exclusion as reason’s product — Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 135 (+3 more)
• SEED: An essay angle: whether disclosure of political values improves or corrupts scientific validity — the Tetlock vs. Sears exchange as a case study.