Perceivers attribute intentions to groups only when groups show mind-like executive function.

Evidence

The model postulated by Malle (2004) primarily concerns how people construct the judgment of intentionality in an individual’s acts. However, the model can be extended to the judgments about groups as well. That is, people may apply a similar kind of “theory of mind” when they try to find meanings in an act by a group. Just as they assume that the source of an individual’s intention resides in his or her mental devices like “brain” or “heart,” they may also look for an executive function in a group as a core of collective intention. To the extent that perceivers can find a certain mind-like function in a group, they will be more likely to use reason explanations, rather than CHR explanations, in understanding a group’s conduct. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 147

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the prejudice thread: attribution of collective intention (e.g., ‘Muslims plan X’, ‘Jews control Y’) may hinge on perceiving group-level executive agency.
• QUESTION: Does group-entitativity perception predict willingness to use dispositional/CHR explanations of outgroup conduct, and could this feed stereotype maintenance?
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 147