People extend theory of mind to groups by looking for an executive brain-like function

Evidence

The model postulated by Malle (2004) primarily concerns how people construct the judgment of intentionality in an individual’s acts. However, the model can be extended to the judgments about groups as well. That is, people may apply a similar kind of “theory of mind” when they try to find meanings in an act by a group. Just as they assume that the source of an individual’s intention resides in his or her mental devices like “brain” or “heart,” they may also look for an executive function in a group as a core of collective intention. To the extent that perceivers can find a certain mind-like function in a group, they will be more likely to use reason explanations, rather than CHR explanations, in understanding a group’s conduct. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 147

Categorization

Category: Causal Relationships

• XREF: Connects to theories of group mind, organizations as intentional actors in international relations, and Durkheim’s collective consciousness.
• SEED: Could anchor an article on when people hold organizations responsible vs. when they excuse them as mere products of circumstance.

Related

• Perceivers attribute intentions to groups only when groups show mind-like executive function. (similarity 0.92)
• Ordinary people readily attribute mental states to groups perceived as mind-like (similarity 0.82)
• Ordinary people readily attribute intentions and desires to groups (similarity 0.82)
• Groups are perceived as unitary mindful entities with intentions (similarity 0.81)
• Perceivers read intentions into cohesive groups more than loose aggregates (similarity 0.81)
• Groups can be perceived as groups through agency and purpose (similarity 0.80)
• Perceivers also generate categorical explanations for whole-group behavior (similarity 0.78)