People sometimes read other minds by simulating the other’s perspective

Evidence

For instance, suppose we are told that another person, similar in age and occupation to ourselves, shares our hobby of going boating on weekends. If our own reasons for this activity include wanting to relax and get away from the city, we will tend to think the other person has similar reasons. But when asked why a feral cat chases a mouse, it is unlikely that we simulate pawing in the underbrush or project our own ways of thinking on the cat (Nichols & Stich, 2003). Rather we rely on common knowledge that feral cats chase mice for food. This difference in mind reading strategy is reflected at the neural level. Mitchell (2009) reported that the medial prefrontal cortex is activated when people infer the mental states of similar others. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 381 (#expands, via linked claim)

People tend to see others as either similar to or different from themselves and that determination underlies the strategy used for mind reading. To the extent that another person is seen as similar, the perceiver is more likely to rely on simulation. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 380 (#expands, via linked claim)

But what determines when each strategy is employed? A common answer has emerged from philosophers (Nichols & Stich, 2003), social cognition researchers (Ames, 2004), and neuroscientists (Mitchell, 2009). People tend to see others as either similar to or different from themselves and that determination underlies the strategy used for mind reading. To the extent that another person is seen as similar, the perceiver is more likely to rely on simulation. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 380 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: People read other minds by applying learned implicit theories about behavior; People simulate similar others’ minds but explain dissimilar others through general knowledge — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 381; Perceived similarity to another person determines which mind-reading strategy is used — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 380 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• People simulate similar others’ minds but explain dissimilar others through general knowledge #expands (0.95) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 381
• Perceivers simulate minds judged similar and theorize about minds judged different #expands (0.95) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 380
• Perceived similarity to another person determines which mind-reading strategy is used #expands (0.92) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 380
• Mind reading draws on stored folk psychological knowledge #complicates (0.88) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 376
• Our own bodily states bias how we read other people’s minds #complicates (0.78) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 378