People simulate similar others’ minds but explain dissimilar others through general knowledge

Evidence

For instance, suppose we are told that another person, similar in age and occupation to ourselves, shares our hobby of going boating on weekends. If our own reasons for this activity include wanting to relax and get away from the city, we will tend to think the other person has similar reasons. But when asked why a feral cat chases a mouse, it is unlikely that we simulate pawing in the underbrush or project our own ways of thinking on the cat (Nichols & Stich, 2003). Rather we rely on common knowledge that feral cats chase mice for food. This difference in mind reading strategy is reflected at the neural level. Mitchell (2009) reported that the medial prefrontal cortex is activated when people infer the mental states of similar others. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 381

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s prejudice thread: outgroup members likely get category-based defaults rather than individualized simulation, feeding depersonalization in bias. — connects to: Perceived physical resemblance licenses presumptive knowledge of others’ inner lives — David Theo Goldberg, The Threat of Race: Reflections on…, 70; Similarity-attraction operates by linking the stranger to the self — Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,…, 131
• DEFINE: Defines the simulation vs. stereotype-based theory-of-mind distinction central to ingroup/outgroup cognition.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 381