People delegate precisely because they lack the expertise to specify the task.
Evidence
Principals can place contractual limitations on agent performance; for example, they can ask auto mechanics to return the parts they replaced or require stockbrokers to consult with them before they trade their portfolio. But many principals hire a mechanic because they have not the faintest idea whether the parts are in working order and a stockbroker because they do not know when it is best to buy, sell, or hold on to their securities. It is precisely because principals are incapable of contractual specification that many of them enter agency relationships in the first place. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 48
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the principal-agent problem as commonly taught in economics and political science, a literature well outside this book’s sociological frame. — connects to: Principals delegate precisely because they cannot specify or evaluate agent performance. — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 48; Political leaders need technical literacy to arbitrate among experts; Congress delegates because it lacks time and expertise for detail — Lawrence M. Friedman and Grant M. Hayden, American Law: An Introduction, 478
Related
- Principals delegate precisely because they cannot specify or evaluate agent performance. (similarity 0.93)
- Political leaders need technical literacy to arbitrate among experts (similarity 0.83)
Broader Connections
- Principals delegate precisely because they cannot specify or evaluate agent performance.
#corroborates(1.00) — Shapiro, Susan P., The Social Control of Impersonal Trust, 48