Past tense predicates require a recollecting synthesis anchored in present being

Evidence

The ordinary understanding of time is what constitutes for Heidegger the unity of the philosophical tradition summed up for him in the name ‘metaphysics’. Metaphysics, in this view, was ruled by a certain determination of being, understood in the sense of presence ( σ α, Anwesenheit), and that is tantamount to privileging the present tense (Gegenwart) with respect to the other dimensions of time. Consequently, the past and future must necessarily appear as either a present time which is just past, or a present which is to come (‘that which is not-yet-now’). In Heidegger’s view, the conception of time as a homogeneous milieu in which events occur dominated philosophy from the Pre-Socratics to Husserl. Hegel stands out however from the other philosophers because he takes to its logical conclusion this traditional privilege of the present. In the speculative conception of time, the future is not even a time like other times: it lacks the power to preserve itself, succumbing to the advances (that is to say, the ontological priority) of the past understood as the previous modality of the present. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 195 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Metaphysics privileges the present tense by defining past and future as modifications of presence — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 195; Grammatical subject-predicate form secretly encodes an ontology that directs reading — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1232

Broader Connections

• Metaphysics privileges the present tense by defining past and future as modifications of presence #qualifies (0.75) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 195