Past moments of spirit form a habitus that dialectic reactualizes.

Evidence

In a certain sense the notion of ις defines a kind of time within time, as if time (ρνς) could, in the transition from a simple πθς to the µεταλ that belongs to the process of ις, exhibit a strange ability to double itself. For ις, as second nature, involves a second nature of time which no longer is part of nature. Nature is repeated because it is transformed; ις is a power elevating time itself to the second power. If Hegel does indeed treat habit as the determining moment of the Anthropology, it is because habit makes possible the transition of nature into spirit, revealing and putting into perspective a temporality no longer belonging to the simple rule of time. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 485 (#expands, via linked claim)

The very grandeur of logical deductions may inadvertently take on a provincial quality. Benjamin’s writings are an attempt in ever new ways to make philosophically fruitful what has not yet been foreclosed by great intentions. The task he bequeathed was not to abandon such an attempt to the estranging enigmas of thought alone, but to bring the intentionless within the realm of concepts: the obligation to think at the same time dialectically and undialectically. — Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 170 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: A person’s varied past selves all exist in the mode of having been — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 418; Man’s habit-forming power exemplifies spirit’s incarnation in time.; Dialectical sublation operates as speculative mourning over past selves. (+5 more)

Broader Connections