Others’ freedom is the condition of, not a limit on, my own freedom

Evidence

And it is not true that the recognition of the freedom of others limits my own freedom: to be free is not to have the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the given toward an open future; the existence of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of my own freedom. I am oppressed if I am thrown into prison, but not if I am kept from throwing my neighbor into prison. — Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 91

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines freedom as the power to surpass the given toward an open future, not as doing as one pleases, and reframes others’ freedom as its enabling condition.
• XREF: Directly connected to the reader’s core reading goal: testing whether ‘willing my freedom requires willing yours’ is derived or smuggled in. This is the key derivation passage. — connects to: The Other’s freedom is the sole separation between my self and the Other — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 749; I can neither direct nor escape the Other’s freedom. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1010; Freedom is the foundational condition of all action — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1069 (+10 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: The core load-bearing move of Beauvoir’s entire ethics: freedom defined relationally, as requiring the freedom of others. This is the passage the reader’s central question turns on.