Ordinary-language philosophy cannot validate meaning because speech encodes manipulated contradictions

Evidence

This must necessarily be so, for language is nothing private and personal, or rather the private and personal is mediated by the available linguistic material, which is societal material. But this situation disqualifies ordinary language from fulfilling the validating function which it performs in analytic philosophy. “What people mean when they say …” is related to what they don’t say. Or, what they mean cannot be taken at face value—not because they lie, but because the universe of thought and practice in which they live is a universe of manipulated contradictions. — Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 699

Categorization

• XREF: This overturns the ordinary-language school (Wittgenstein, Austin); links to Chomsky’s manufactured consent and the ‘you don’t know what you mean under conditions of manipulation’ idea. — connects to: Words used instrumentally become lies; only obdurate thought resists; Contradiction has become the operating principle of manipulative discourse — Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the…, 387; Critical dialectical language exposes contradiction while Orwellian language hides it — Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the…, 411 (+6 more)
• QUESTION: How would a Marcusean respond to empirical pragmatics/speech-act theory that treats ordinary usage as authoritative data? Worth chasing in Searle/Austin commentary.

Broader Connections

• Secondary codification of truth through dialectic remains structurally unclarified #expands (0.80) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 644
• Philosophical propositions dialectically preserve, suppress, and present their cancelled form #expands (0.80)
• Austin’s speech-act theory smuggled nonlinguistic reality into philosophy under a linguistic name #corroborates (0.75)