Ontology cannot predict the content of any individual’s free acts

Evidence

We shall grant to idealism that the being of the For-itself is knoweldge of being, but we must add that this knowledge has being. The identity of the being of the For-itself and of knowledge does not come from the fact that knowledge is the measure of being but from the fact that the For-itself makes known to itself what it is, through the in-itself; that is, from the fact that in its being it is a relation to being. Knowledge is nothing other than the presence of being to the For-itself, and the For-itself is only the nothing which realizes that presence. Thus knowledge is by nature ekstatic being, and because of that fact it is confused with the ekstatic being of the For-itself. The For-itself does not exist in order subsequently to know; neither can we say that it exists only in so far as it knows or is known, for this would be to make being vanish into an infinity regulated by particular bits of knowledge. Knowing is an absolute and primitive event; it is the absolute upsurge of the For-itself in the midst of being and beyond being, in terms of the being which it is not and as the negation of that being and a self nihilation. In a word, by a radical reversal of the idealist position, knowledge is reabsorbed in being. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 651 (#expands, via linked claim)

Trust is not a means that can be chosen for particular ends, much less an ends/means structure capable of being optimized. Nor is trust a prognosis; its correctness cannot be measured by the occurrence of the predicted event and after some experiences have been reduced to probability values. These types of techniques, which are significant within the framework of decision-making models, have, as does trust, the function of reducing complexity. They are functional equivalents for trust, but not acts of trust in the true sense. As far as they extend, trust is unnecessary. They can replace trust, just as, conversely, the need for trust as a complementary way of absorbing uncertainty is a result of the limited effectiveness of those decision-making techniques. Trust is, however, something other than a reasonable assumption on which to decide correctly, and for this reason models for calculating correct decisions miss the point of the question of trust. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 307 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Knowledge is not a property but is the ekstatic being of the For-itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 651; Trust cannot be modeled as rational choice or probabilistic prediction — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 307; No one can determine their own life within a comprehensible framework — Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from…, 33

Broader Connections

• Knowledge is not a property but is the ekstatic being of the For-itself #expands (0.78) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 651
• Trust cannot be modeled as rational choice or probabilistic prediction #expands (0.72) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 307