Non-arbitrary interference tracking the agent’s interests does not compromise freedom

Evidence

If non-intentional obstruction can be overlooked in one ideal of freedom, then why not allow that another ideal may overlook the sort of interference—the sort of intentional obstruction or coercion—that is nonarbitrary, being required to track the agent’s interests and ideas ? Such non-arbitrary interference, after all, is saliently different from the interference that someone can perpetrate at their own pleasure. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 142

Categorization

• DEFINE: Establishes that interference tracking the agent’s interests counts as non-arbitrary and thus compatible with freedom under republicanism.
• XREF: connects to: Interference is non-dominating when structured by shared-interest conditions and contestable penalties — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 128; Interference can be non-arbitrary when institutions force officials to track citizens’ interests — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 331; State interference is non-arbitrary when it tracks shared rather than exceptional interests. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 293

Broader Connections

• State interference is non-arbitrary when it tracks shared rather than exceptional interests. #expands (0.92) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 293
• Interference can be non-arbitrary when institutions force officials to track citizens’ interests #corroborates (0.88) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 331