Moral judgments like torture’s inhumanity need no expert validation

Evidence

The story struck me as illogical (which it was), and therefore wrong (which it was not). It took the Holocaust to convince me that the second does not necessarily follow from the first. — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 585 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

In keeping with Beauvoir’s views, Freire contends that to be human is to exist as an ethical being (Freire, 1998a). As reflective beings facing an uncertain world, we must decide what to do; we must exercise the distinctive responsibilities we have as humans and commit, even though we can never be certain of quite what will happen as we act in the world. As Beauvoir recognized, and as Freire also acknowledges, this can be unsettling and distressing, but it is also the basis of our freedom. The ethical dimension of human existence is, Freire would add, also the foundation for our formation as educational beings. Freire, like Beauvoir, does not equate freedom with license; he speaks of the need for limits to freedom, consistent with the principle of ensuring, as far as reasonably possible, that our actions as free beings do not to impede the pursuit of humanization by others. — James D. Kirylo (ed.), Reinventing Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 889 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Moral obligation need not be logical to be valid — Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, 585; Humans must commit to ethical action without certainty of consequences — James D. Kirylo (ed.), Reinventing Pedagogy of the Oppressed:…, 889

Broader Connections