Measuring judicial race bias requires cases identical except for defendant race.

Evidence

To identify the “true” and direct impact of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or gender on the outcome of a case, one needs to account for every aspect of a case that may be correlated with the race, ethnicity, or gender of the defendant and which may also impact the outcome of the case. Thus, researchers aim to find two groups of cases that are identical in all possible dimensions (e.g., the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the criminal history of the defendant, the attributes of the prosecutor, the characteristics of the defense attorney, and the income and education level of the defendant), but that differ only in the race of the defendant. If the resolution of these cases is different (e.g., the defendants in the first group are convicted more frequently in comparison to the defendants in the other group), then the disparity can be attributed to the racial differences between the defendants. — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 732 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

One complication in these analyses is the potential of systematic “sorting” of defendants to judges. For example, assume that there are two types of judges in the same courthouse: Type-L and Type-H. Type-L judges are lenient—they convict defendants at lower rates and assign shorter prison terms. Type-H judges are harsh by nature—they convict defendants at higher rates and assign longer sentences. Now assume that most minority defendants are channeled to judges of Type-H, and that most White defendants are put in front of Type-L judges. Even if judges were not racially biased, the end result of this sorting would be that minority defendants would end up with higher conviction probabilities and longer sentences in comparison to White defendants. One obvious method to overcome the confounding that is generated by this type of sorting is to employ data from jurisdictions that use random assignment of cases to judges. — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 737 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Isolating racial bias requires cases identical except for race — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law: A Definitive Look at…, 732; Judges’ case outcomes can show racial bias even when judges themselves are unbiased — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law: A Definitive Look at…, 729; Omitted variables correlated with race make regression estimates of judicial bias unreliable (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Isolating racial bias requires cases identical except for race #corroborates (0.97) — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 732
• Apparent judicial racial bias can stem from prosecutors’ bias, not judges’ own. #complicates (0.78)
• Racial sentencing disparities can arise from case sorting even with unbiased judges #complicates (0.76) — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 737
• Judges can project racial bias from earlier actors in the case pipeline #complicates (0.74)