Malabou’s limit of knowledge may coincide with theological unintelligibility

Evidence

I ask myself what is the subtle difference which distinguishes this interpretation, that of Malabou (as to what remains foreign to knowledge, ‘cannot be an object of knowledge’, even if this limit, its limit is ‘what Absolute Knowledge knows’), from the one proposed by so many ‘different authors’, theologians and thinkers of the Lutheran or Catholic faith, authors whom Malabou confronts. For she recognizes at one point that they do not ‘deny any implication of unintelligibility’. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1293

Categorization

Category: Definitional Content

• QUESTION: The translator wonder whether Malabou’s ‘foreign to knowledge’ is really distinct from the theologians’ incomprehensibility — an open interpretive thread worth chasing.

Related

• Absolute knowledge is knowledge of its own limit, beyond which lies heterogeneity (similarity 0.83)
• God’s incomprehensibility is a matter of order, not of knowledge’s limits (similarity 0.82)
• God’s incomprehensibility means he exceeds knowledge, not that reason fails him. (similarity 0.82)
• Absolute Knowledge requires active interpretation rather than passive contemplation (similarity 0.78)
• Absolute Knowledge’s stopping role must be necessity, not chance (similarity 0.78)