Majority rule works only when members’ interests are homogeneous

Evidence

Practice is not entirely removed from this abstract theory. The best student of the federation of English trade unions says that their majority decisions are justifiable and practicable only insofar as the interests of the various confederates are homogeneous. As soon as differences of opinion between majority and minority result from real differences in interests, any compulsion produced by outvoting inevitably leads to a separation of the members. In other words, a vote makes sense only if the existing interests can fuse into a unity. — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 6251

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Simmel’s broader triad/unity theory and to modern social-choice work on preference heterogeneity undermining aggregative mechanisms. — connects to: Rules function as rules only if they tolerate some suboptimal outcomes — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 223; Dominance is maintained through unstable equilibria that concede some subordinate interests; Communal philosophy need not imply unanimous belief among members (+2 more)
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 6251

Broader Connections

• Rules function as rules only if they tolerate some suboptimal outcomes #qualifies (0.80) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 223
• Communal philosophy need not imply unanimous belief among members #expands (0.80)
• Dominance is maintained through unstable equilibria that concede some subordinate interests #exemplifies (0.75)