Maintaining ideological rigidity blocks elite turnover and party renewal

Evidence

In its effort to prevent the resurrection of “rightwing opportunism,” the KSCˇ Politburo did not turn over its mid-level cadres and did not bring in any new members (unless an incumbent died) until 1987, when Jakesˇ’s dogmatic wing of the party took over from the conservative pragmatic Gustav Hus k. 51 As a result, an average of only 13% of the Politburo leadership changed every year (16% if we include the changes made in 1968) in the last two decades of communist rule (see Table 1.3), less than half the rates in Poland. Moreover, elites who left did so as a result of retirement or death – there was minimal horizontal movement to other positions. — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 221

Categorization

• XREF: Czech Politburo turnover (13%/yr) gives a comparative baseline against which to measure Polish and Hungarian parties that regenerated after 1989. — connects to: Party leaders relied on ideological purity and saturation for control — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 177; Closed recruitment selecting for ideological loyalty produced hidebound elites unable to adapt — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 216; Elites socialized in rigid party apparats cannot lead genuine reform — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 338 (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Closed recruitment selecting for ideological loyalty produced hidebound elites unable to adapt #corroborates (0.92) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 216
• Elites socialized in rigid party apparats cannot lead genuine reform #corroborates (0.90) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 338
• Ideological change requires persistence against contrary immediate evidence #qualifies (0.78) — Angus Burgin, The Great Persuasion, 561