Low-prejudice people are less susceptible to stereotype rebound effects

Evidence

For instance, Monteith, Spicer, and Tooman (1998) found that low-prejudice participants are less susceptible to rebound effects than high-prejudice participants. Presumably, low-prejudice people are more motivated to control the application of cultural stereotypes and have more practice with such control than their high-prejudice counterparts. To be sure, the impact of egalitarian goals or norms may also be situated at the activation stage in that low-prejudice people may simply never evoke the derogatory stereotype in the first place (Lepore & Brown, 1997; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). Also, it seems that not all target categories lend themselves to rebound effects, as stereotype control is likely to be maintained on a spontaneous basis for categories that are highly sensitive (e.g., race). — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1182 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Research on mental control suggests that this commendable line of action may not always be the ideal strategy it seems to be at first sight. Indeed, because suppression apparently activates the very stereotype people wish to combat, stereotypic materials can become even more accessible during later encounters with members of the target group, causing a “rebound” effect of stereotypes on judgment and behavior when suppression is no longer enforced (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). The paradoxical consequences of suppression are also demonstrated in studies showing that perceivers initially asked to suppress a stereotype later preferentially recalled (Macrae et al., 1996) and recognized (Sherman et al., 1997) stereotype-consistent over stereotype-inconsistent materials presented during the suppression episode. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1181 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Research on mental control suggests that this commendable line of action may not always be the ideal strategy it seems to be at first sight. Indeed, because suppression apparently activates the very stereotype people wish to combat, stereotypic materials can become even more accessible during later encounters with members of the target group, causing a “rebound” effect of stereotypes on judgment and behavior when suppression is no longer enforced (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). The paradoxical consequences of suppression are also demonstrated in studies showing that perceivers initially asked to suppress a stereotype later preferentially recalled (Macrae et al., 1996) and recognized (Sherman et al., 1997) stereotype-consistent over stereotype-inconsistent materials presented during the suppression episode. — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1181 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Mortality salience increases stereotypic thinking and preference for stereotype-confirming others. — Jeff Greenberg and Spee Kosloff, Terror Management Theory: Implications…, 45; Tolerating complexity in perceptions prevents prejudiced stereotyping; Low-prejudice people suppress stereotypes without suffering rebound effects. — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1182 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Low-prejudice people suppress stereotypes without suffering rebound effects. #corroborates (0.95) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1182
• Suppressing stereotypes paradoxically makes them more accessible later #complicates (0.80) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1181
• Suppressing a stereotype paradoxically makes it rebound more powerfully later #complicates (0.78) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1181