Low political insulation delays fiscal reforms in advanced democracies

Evidence

Incidentally, low insulation may actually lead into some problems in advanced democracies. For instance, a vast literature surveyed in Alesina and Perotti (1994) show that low insulation, as measured by electoral laws, systems of government etc., may delay the implementation of fiscal reforms. In a sense, this is the cost of insurance against undesirable (by some) fiscal reforms. — Philippe Aghion, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, Endogenous Political Institutions, 182

Categorization

• DEEPTHINKING: Reframes gridlock as the deliberate price of insurance against bad reforms — a reframing that resists a glib summary.
• XREF: Directly connects to Alesina and Perotti (1994) and to current debates about democratic paralysis.