Local demographics shaped whether nationalism took religious or secular form

Evidence

Thus, Egyptian Nationalism (Urabi Revolution of 1882), at the turn of the twentieth century, had a distinctly Islamic dimension and a very visible anti-British ideology. This was primarily due to the fact that the British who had already “ruled” Egypt since 1875, landed troops in 1882 and occupied this part of the Ottoman Empire (Glavanis, 1975). On the other hand, in Lebanon the demographic “balance” between Christians and Muslims gave rise to a situation where some Christians (Maronites) openly sought protection from European states (primarily France), while the Muslim and the Christian Orthodox communities advocated a secular nationalism in opposition both to Ottoman control and European encroachments. Similarly, the early Zionist attempts to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine, under British protection, led the Palestinian Arabs to suppress religious differences in favor of a Palestinian nationalism aimed against British and European Jewish encroachments on their land. — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 3473

Categorization

• QUESTION: The causal chain ‘demographic balance -> Maronites seek French protection’ deserves closer study — is it a generalizable pattern?
• XREF: Echoes earlier reading on how power relations and external patrons shape identity politics. — connects to: Religious demographics historically shaped Supreme Court seat allocation — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 523; Religious nationalism since the 1970s is a desecularizing movement worldwide, not ancient revival — Nadim N. Rouhana and Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, When Politics Are Sacralized:…, 1498; Secularization and demography did not end Christian nationalism — Katherine Stewart, The Power Worshippers: Inside the…, 46 (+1 more)