Langdell’s legal science was geometric deduction from cases, not empirical observation

Evidence

Langdell’s proudest boast was that law was a science, and that his method was highly scientific. But his model of science was not experimental, or experiential; his model was Euclid’s geometry, not physics or biology. Langdell considered law a pure, independent science; it was, he conceded, empirical, but the only data he allowed were reported cases. If law is at all the product of society, then Langdell’s science of law was a geology without rocks, an astronomy without stars. Lawyers and judges raised on the method, if they took their training at all seriously, came to speak of law mainly in terms of a dry, arid logic, divorced from society and life. — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 3543

Categorization

• XREF: This builds toward the later claim that Langdell’s curriculum excluded statutory and constitutional law as unscientific — the ‘pure science of law’ abstraction animates both. — connects to: Langdell conceived law as a science whose primary sources are printed cases — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 3519; Langdell’s curriculum excluded statutory and constitutional law as unscientific — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 3528; Langdell’s legal-science ideas made late-century legal scholarship inbred and free of social commentary. — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 3584 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Langdell’s legal-science ideas made late-century legal scholarship inbred and free of social commentary. #expands (0.90) — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 3584
• Deductive legal analysis applies established characteristic propositions to new cases #expands (0.85) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 680