Justice criteria vary with how social goods are valued, not by universal principle

Evidence

For Walzer, not only are different things valued differently by different people, but this means that the very criteria for distribution will differ according to how we value things. Social meanings of objects, procedures, and principles are historical and will change over time; hence Walzer introduces a notion of a ‘distributive sphere’, where conceptions of justice are limited in place and time. Walzer’s approach to the discussion of justice in a real, diverse world is more complex and more grounded than Rawls’s ‘veil of ignorance’. While Walzer remains tied to the concept, and language, of justice purely as a concept of distribution, we can extend his arguments regarding justice and plurality into additional conceptions of justice, in addition to various interpretations of distribution. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 570

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Singular universal justice definitions exclude real justice claims — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 564; Legal outcomes depend on variable choices and value judgments rather than absolutes. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 752; Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Legal outcomes depend on variable choices and value judgments rather than absolutes. #corroborates (0.82) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 752
• Moral standards vary by setting and allow selective application #corroborates (0.80) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 217
• Moral obligations derive from objective ideality, not from society or individual will #contradicts (0.78) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 356