Judicial review’s deterrent fear may explain American labor’s non-militancy

Evidence

What impact did judicial review have on the course of labor history? Or social history in general? Or political history? It is impossible to tell. Fear of what courts could do, or might do, or would do, probably did have an influence on legislation. It has been argued that judicial review had a real impact on the labor movement, and on American social history in general. It helps explain why nothing like the British Labor Party ever developed in the United States, or why most American unions seemed to lack the militant edge of their European counterparts. Unfortunately, it is impossible to rewind the tape to see what would have happened if there had been no judicial review, no labor injunction, no Fourteenth Amendment. — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 3214

Categorization

• QUESTION: The claim that judicial review explains labor’s missing militancy is asserted as plausible but untestable — worth chasing the comparative historiography on US vs European labor politics.
• XREF: connects to: Judicial review made courts seem reactionary fortresses to labor and reformers — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 2099; Neoliberal fears of regulatory coercion outweighed cost-benefit arguments in shaping US regulatory policy — Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 345; Extra-legal justifications of judicial review lead to infinite regress — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 646 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Neoliberal fears of regulatory coercion outweighed cost-benefit arguments in shaping US regulatory policy #corroborates (0.85) — Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 345
• Extra-legal justifications of judicial review lead to infinite regress #expands (0.80) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 646
• Deceptive judicial rhetoric does not refute explanations of behavior #expands (0.78) — Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 120