Interference occurs regardless of whether the interfering act is morally justified

Evidence

But though interference always involves the attempt to worsen an agent’s situation, it need not always involve a wrongful act: coercion remains coercion, even if it is morally impeccable. I interfere with you if I obstruct your making a phone call by deliberately occupying the only kiosk available: and this, even though it is perfectly within my rights to occupy that kiosk. I interfere with you if I destroy your custom by deliberately undercutting your prices—assuming I have the required resources—whenever you try to sell your wares: and this, again, even if our market culture tolerates my behaviour. I even interfere with you if I stop you interfering with another, where my act is morally required, not just morally innocent. The notion of interference, as I employ it here, is entirely unmoralized: whether one person interferes with another is decidable without reference to whether any particular moral offence has occurred; it is decidable just in the light of the facts, albeit the facts as they are seen through the local cultural lens. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 287

Categorization

• DEFINE: Pettit’s unmoralized notion of interference is the load-bearing technical distinction separating his account of domination from accounts that treat interference as wrongdoing.
• XREF: connects to: Interference is a factual, moral-free concept independent of wrongfulness — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 287; Any moral principle admitting its opposite becomes meaningless without unambiguous situations; Whether harm counts as morally wrong depends on context and justification — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3863

Broader Connections

• Interference is a factual, moral-free concept independent of wrongfulness #corroborates (0.95) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 287
• Whether harm counts as morally wrong depends on context and justification #contradicts (0.90) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 3863
• Any moral principle admitting its opposite becomes meaningless without unambiguous situations #qualifies (0.75)