Interference is a factual, moral-free concept independent of wrongfulness

Evidence

I interfere with you if I obstruct your making a phone call by deliberately occupying the only kiosk available: and this, even though it is perfectly within my rights to occupy that kiosk. I interfere with you if I destroy your custom by deliberately undercutting your prices—assuming I have the required resources—whenever you try to sell your wares: and this, again, even if our market culture tolerates my behaviour. I even interfere with you if I stop you interfering with another, where my act is morally required, not just morally innocent. The notion of interference, as I employ it here, is entirely unmoralized: whether one person interferes with another is decidable without reference to whether any particular moral offence has occurred; it is decidable just in the light of the facts, albeit the facts as they are seen through the local cultural lens. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 287

Categorization

• DEFINE: Pettit explicitly separates the concept of interference from moralized notions, so the later claim about domination can proceed without begging questions about wrongness.
• XREF: connects to: Interference occurs regardless of whether the interfering act is morally justified — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 287