Interest-based accounts of justice to nature fail to cover rivers, mountains, and clouds

Evidence

Baxter offers no moral accountability for the nonliving aspects of the natural world. Baxter limits his extension of the community of justice to living organisms with interests. Even though various nonliving entities—mountains, rivers, and clouds—make contributions to the sum total of environmental benefits, they have no interests, argues Baxter. While such a distinction makes sense in terms of how we understand a recipient of the moral consideration of justice—Baxter is referring to individual nonhuman animals with welfare interests—it unnecessarily limits the extension of justice to nature. Nonhuman, nonliving nature remains the environment in which all other beings exist, sustain themselves, develop interests, and, for humans, develop preferences for the good life. We are still left with the task of finding a way to include a larger consideration of nature in a conception of justice. — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice, 399

Categorization

  • QUESTION: If nonliving nature can’t be a recipient under interest-based distributive justice, does a recognition frame (place-as-identity, from ch58) cover rivers and land better?
  • XREF: Directly relevant to Eco-Justice and to the earlier ch58 claim that environmental degradation of a place is an attack on community identity. — connects to: Justice can attach to viable populations of species rather than to individuals — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 395; Justice to nature can rest on shared qualities without erasing difference — David Schlosberg, Defining Environmental Justice:…, 449; The philosophical-scientific worldview blocks environmental ethics from valuing insentient nature

Broader Connections