Ingroup defense functions as a compensatory control mechanism when personal control is lost.

Evidence

On a higher-order level, people may regulate levels of perceived control by using social groups as sources of external control. It has been argued that a major psychological benefit of social ingroups is that they can provide the individual with a notion of vicarious control — the perception that the world is under control by powerful others (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). Accordingly, Fritsche et al. (2008) reasoned that ingroup defense following control deprivation can be understood as an attempt to regain control on the group-level (i.e., group-based control restoration). In line with this reasoning, low trait and state control has been found to increase various instances of ingroup defense, including ethnocentrism, prejudice toward outgroups, and ingroup bias (Agroskin & Jonas, 2010; Fritsche et al., 2008, Fritsche et al., 2013). — Dmitrij Agroskin and Eva Jonas, Controlling death by defending ingroups, 24

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s purpose: this frames a group identity whose functional role is vicarious control rather than affirmative content — potentially the boundary-defense case being sought. — connects to: Death-thought accessibility does not mediate ingroup defense, while control motivation does. — Dmitrij Agroskin and Eva Jonas, Controlling death by defending…, 4; Control motivation but not implicit death cognition drives threat-based ingroup defense. — Dmitrij Agroskin and Eva Jonas, Controlling death by defending…, 143; Mortality salience triggers ingroup defense through control deprivation — Dmitrij Agroskin and Eva Jonas, Controlling death by defending…, 27 (+5 more)
  • corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Dmitrij Agroskin and Eva Jonas, Controlling death by defending…, 24

Broader Connections