Incumbency-oriented voting results from risk asymmetry, not merely punishment.

Evidence

Together, the responses to problems 1–4 confirm the prediction of prospect theory that people are risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk-seeking in the domain of losses, where gains and losses were defined relative to the outcomes projected for other countries. These results may shed light on the so-called incumbency-oriented voting hypothesis. Numerous investigators have shown that the evaluation of an incumbent party is responsive to fluctuations in the national economy. In general, incumbent presidents and congressional candidates of the same party benefit at the polls from improving economic conditions whereas they suffer from deteriorating conditions (Kramer, 1971). These results can be understood, in part, as a consequence of the divergent attitudes towards risks for outcomes involving gains and losses. Following Shepsle (1972), we maintain that incumbents are usually regarded by voters as less risky than the challengers, who are often unknowns and whose policies could drastically alter the current trends, for better or for worse. If people are risk-averse for gains and risk-seeking for losses, the less risky incumbent should fare better when conditions are good than when they are bad. This analysis assumes that the re-election of the incumbent is perceived by voters as a continuation of the current trends, which is attractive when times are good. In contrast, the election of the challenger offers a political gamble that is worth taking when “four more years” of the incumbent is viewed as an unsatisfactory state. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2440

Categorization

• SEED: The insight that ‘electing a challenger is a gamble worth taking only in bad times’ reframes incumbent advantage as an artifact of reference-point psychology — a possible essay on why voters punish incumbents by risk-seeking rather than by retrospective judgment.
• XREF: connects to: Bad times make voters choose riskier challengers even with equal expected value; Incumbent advantage reflects voter risk aversion in gains while challengers benefit in losses — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2406; Risky challengers win bad-time votes despite equal expected value. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology: Key Readings, 2441 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Incumbent advantage reflects voter risk aversion in gains while challengers benefit in losses #expands (0.90) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2406
• Loss aversion explains why incumbents win except during bad times. #corroborates (0.90) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2450
• Bad times make voters choose riskier challengers even with equal expected value #expands (0.85)
• Risky challengers win bad-time votes despite equal expected value. #corroborates (0.85) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 2441