In-group trust bias is stronger in individualist than collectivist cultures

Evidence

In contrast to the popular view, evidence suggests that this in-group bias in trust is actually larger for people from individualist cultures than for those from collectivist cultures, where in-group–out-group distinction is made on a categorical basis (Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 2002; Buchan, Johnson, & Croson, 2006; Yamagishi, Makimura, Foddy, Matsuda, Kiyonari, & Platow, 2005). — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1632

Categorization

  • XREF: Complicates the Allport thread’s implicit assumption that group-categorization prejudice maps onto ā€˜collectivist’ societies, and connects to trust-as-reputation mechanisms from the law-merchant and diamond-trade sources. — connects to: In-group boundaries within collectivism are permeable only by birth, not achievement — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social…, 1025; Collectivist frames attribute causality to whole groups rather than individual actors — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social…, 1028
  • corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1632