In-group trust bias is stronger in individualist than collectivist cultures
Evidence
In contrast to the popular view, evidence suggests that this in-group bias in trust is actually larger for people from individualist cultures than for those from collectivist cultures, where in-groupāout-group distinction is made on a categorical basis (Buchan, Croson, & Dawes, 2002; Buchan, Johnson, & Croson, 2006; Yamagishi, Makimura, Foddy, Matsuda, Kiyonari, & Platow, 2005). ā Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, andā¦, 1632
Categorization
- XREF: Complicates the Allport threadās implicit assumption that group-categorization prejudice maps onto ācollectivistā societies, and connects to trust-as-reputation mechanisms from the law-merchant and diamond-trade sources. ā connects to: In-group boundaries within collectivism are permeable only by birth, not achievement ā Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Socialā¦, 1025; Collectivist frames attribute causality to whole groups rather than individual actors ā Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Socialā¦, 1028
- corroborated: 3 independent passages support this claim ā Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, andā¦, 1632