Ideology has replaced patronage in appeals court selection since recent decades

Evidence

The partisan and ideological furor over Judge Pickering and several other Bush nominees reflects the increasing polarization of American politics—Republican senators had opposed some of President Bill Clinton’s nominees just as vehemently as Democrats opposed Pickering. The conflict also reveals the increasing importance that advocacy groups on both sides of the political spectrum attach to appeals court nominations and their increasing influence in the selection process. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 514 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

As noted in Chapter 3, judicial selection is a political process. Presidents typically nominate members of their own political party for federal judgeships, and they inquire into potential nominees’ legal and political views, especially before filling vacancies on the Supreme Court. Politics also affects judicial selection in the states. Partisan election systems, of course, reward loyal and active party members. Political considerations also affect gubernatorial appointments, even when governors are choosing judges under the process of “merit selection.” Given the extensive political backgrounds of those who become judges, they tend to bring to the bench consistent and long-established political views. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2571 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Taking similar cases in various states, some found … But some studies have uncovered differences: appointed judges were more likely to vindicate the rights of defendants in criminal procedure cases and more likely to uphold claims of sex discrimination. — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 633 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Interest groups increasingly influence federal appeals court nominations — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 514; Political selection fills the courts with judges holding established partisan views — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2571; Presidents differ sharply in how much ideological screening they apply to judicial nominees — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 493 (+4 more)

Related

• Interest groups increasingly influence federal appeals court nominations (similarity 0.90)
• Political selection fills the courts with judges holding established partisan views (similarity 0.86)
• No judicial selection system fully eliminates political influence (similarity 0.85)
• Selection method produces few but patterned differences in judicial voting. (similarity 0.83)
• Judges bring long-established political views to the bench because selection is itself political. (similarity 0.82)
• Presidents differ sharply in how much ideological screening they apply to judicial nominees (similarity 0.82)
• No judicial selection system can eliminate ideological influence. (similarity 0.81)
• Sitting justices rarely change views, so screening nominees works (similarity 0.81)
• Selection-system shifts trace the alternating ideals of independence and accountability. (similarity 0.80)
• Judicial merit is necessary but never decisive in federal appointments. (similarity 0.80)
• Senate initiations and presidential involvement in appointments vary by court level (similarity 0.79)
• Demographic representation is a third competing value in judicial selection (similarity 0.79)
• Presidents must balance confirmability against ideological purity when choosing nominees (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Interest groups increasingly influence federal appeals court nominations #corroborates (0.82) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 514
• Political selection fills the courts with judges holding established partisan views #corroborates (0.75) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 2571
• Selection method produces few but patterned differences in judicial voting. #expands (0.74) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 633
• Demographic representation is a third competing value in judicial selection #qualifies (0.72) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 591
• Presidents differ sharply in how much ideological screening they apply to judicial nominees #expands (0.70) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 493
• Judicial independence advocates favor insulated selection and long tenure #complicates (0.70) — G. Alan Tarr, Judicial Process and Judicial…, 589