Husserl’s Other is a constitutive category, not a real being

Evidence

The Other here would be a kind of supplementary category which would allow a world to be constituted, not a real being existing beyond this world. … It has the pure value of the content of a unifying concept; it is valid in and for the world. Its laws are limited to the world, and the Other is by nature outside the world. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 681

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Kant’s transcendental categories and to the later Sartrean distinction between being-for-others and being-in-itself; relevant backdrop for Beauvoir’s account of recognition. — connects to: The Other is a concrete particular condition, not a formal category, of self-awareness; The Other’s essential character is objectivity, not embodied life.
• yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: The Other is a concrete particular condition, not a formal category, of self-awareness; The Other’s essential character is objectivity, not embodied life.

Broader Connections

• The Other is a concrete particular condition, not a formal category, of self-awareness #contradicts (0.85)
• The Other’s essential character is objectivity, not embodied life. #contradicts (0.85)