Husserl’s noema doctrine reduces being to appearing, a form of Berkeleyan idealism.

Evidence

If then we wish at any price to make the being of the phenomenon depend on consciousness, the object must be distinguished from consciousness not by its presence but by its absence, not by its plenitude, but by its nothingness. If being belongs to consciousness, the object is not consciousness, not to the extent that it is another being, but that it is non-being. This is the appeal to the infinite of which we spoke in the first section of this work. For Husserl, for example, the animation of the hyletic nucleus by the only intentions which can find their fulfilment (ErfĂŒllung) in this hyle is not enough to bring us outside of subjectivity. The truly objectifying intentions are empty intentions, those which aim beyond the present subjective appearance at the infinite totality of the series of appearances. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 148 (#expands, via linked claim)

Husserl certainly turned idealist enough during his long reign in Freiburg to alienate a few key disciples. Among those to complain about it early on was Edith Stein, shortly after she finished her PhD thesis on the phenomenology of empathy — a subject that led her to look for connections and bonds between people in a shared exterior environment, not a withdrawn and solitary one. Early in 1917, she and Husserl had a long debate on the subject, with her sitting in the ‘dear old leather sofa’ where his favourites usually sat in his office. They argued for two hours without reaching agreement, and shortly afterwards Stein resigned as his assistant and left Freiburg. — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist CafĂ©, 166 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Husserl betrays his own insight by making the noema a mental correlate; Idealism reduces the object to non-being, a lack defined by absence — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on
, 148; Husserl’s idealist turn alienated disciples who favored intersubjective experience — Sarah Bakewell, At the Existentialist CafĂ©: Freedom,
, 166 (+1 more)

Broader Connections