Human rights law recognizes only suffering to natural being, not civil harm

Evidence

Regan, of course, as part of the animal rights movement, is mainly concerned not with wild animals but with domestic animals as they appear in the context of and support of human society and culture, although he does not indicate any qualification in moral treatment. Nevertheless, there may be an important moral boundary here, for natural ecosystems cannot be organised along the lines of justice, fairness and rights, and it would be absurd to try to impose such a social order upon them via intervention in these systems. This does not mean of course that humans can do anything in such a situation, just that certain kinds of intervention are not in order. But these kinds of intervention may be in order in the case of human social systems, and in the case of animals which have already, through human intervention, been brought into these social systems, and the concept of rights and of social responsibility may have far more application here. This would mean that the domestic/wild distinction would demarcate an important moral boundary in terms of duties of intervention. — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 786 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Human rights proved helpless for people stripped of every status except being human; Inalienable human rights prove unenforceable for anyone outside a sovereign state — Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 714; Rights-based ethics apply to domestic but not wild nature — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 786 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• Rights-based ethics apply to domestic but not wild nature #complicates (0.72) — Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, 786