Hountondji’s individual-centered rationality ignores how social institutions shape consciousness

Evidence

Hountondji’s attempt at the refutation of Tempels and his disciples is untenable because he is obsessed with classical individual-centred rationality. He does not take into account the ways in which social institutions and social processes structure and restrain individual consciousness, impose and warp judgement, contaminate it with collective representations. — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 552

Hountondji’s attempt at the refutation of Tempels and his disciples is untenable because he is obsessed with classical individual-centred rationality. He does not take into account the ways in which social institutions and social processes structure and restrain individual consciousness, impose and warp judgement, contaminate it with collective representations. Hountondji’s view of the individual and peoples is monolithic in that it is full of much consistent rationality in the individual. The notion of African peoples living in communities today is full of complexities. Hence, Hountondji also needs to be reconsidered. — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 552

Categorization

• XREF: Author’s own counter-critique of Hountondji points toward a social-epistemology critique that parallels Milgrom’s reputation-institutions literature on how social structures enable rational action. — connects to: The world’s instrumental organization depends partly on constituting consciousness; the MOC “The Forge and the Other: How Power, Discourse, and Encounter Cast the Self”
• QUESTION: Does Hountondji’s own position later soften, recognizing communitarian thought? This claim of ‘monolithic individuality’ invites checking his later writings.
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Frans Dokman, Beyond Bantu Philosophy_…, 552