Heidegger’s being-with is primordial co-existence, not interpersonal confrontation.

Evidence

First of all, the ontological point of view joins here with the abstract view of the Kantian subject. To say that human reality (even if it is my human reality) “is-with” by means of its ontological structure is to say that it is-with by nature—that is, in an essential and universal capacity. Even if this affirmation were proved, it would not enable us to explain any concrete being-with. In other words, the ontological co-existence which appears as the structure of “being-in-the-world” can in no way serve as a foundation to an ontic being-with, such as, for example, the co-existence which appears in my friendship with Pierre or in the couple which Annie and I make. In fact it would be necessary to show that “being-with-Pierre” or “being-with-Annie” is a structure constitutive of my concreate-being. But this is impossible from the point of view which Heidegger has adopted. The Other in the relation “with,” taken on the ontological level, can not in fact be concretely determined any more than the directly confronted human-reality of which it is the alter ego; it is an abstract term and hence unselbständig, and it does not contain the power of becoming that Other—Pierre or Annie. Thus the relation of the MitSein can be of absolutely no use to us in resolving the psychological, concrete problem of the recognition of the Other. There are two incommunicable levels and two problems which demand separate solutions. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 703 (#complicates, via linked claim)

It appears therefore that the experience of the “We” and the “Us” although real, is not of a nature to modify the results of our prior investigations. As for the Us-object, this is directly dependent on the Third—i.e., on my being-for-others—and it is constituted on the foundation of my being-outside-for-others. And as for the We-subject, this is a psychological experience which supposes one way or another that the Other’s existence as such has been already revealed to us. It is therefore useless for human-reality to seek to get out of this dilemma: one must either transcend the Other or allow oneself to be transcended by him. The essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not the Mitsein; it is conflict. — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1044 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

But neither is co-presence simply coexistence. For two entities to be said to be coexistent, it is enough that they exist at the same time, simultaneously. But co-presence assumes more than that, namely the possibility for one term to affect the other or to be affected by it (a relation of causality). In other words, co-presence is defined by an instantaneous but not necessarily actualized possibility of a real relationship. Yet another way of putting this is to say that co-presence is defined by the accessibility of one term to the other. To be co-present they must be within reach of each other. Two armies are in the presence of each other when they are within range, and that is the case even when not a shot has been fired. It is this notion of range that distinguishes co-presence, as a pragmatic concept, from mere co-existence. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 948 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Heidegger’s ontological being-with cannot explain concrete relations with particular others — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 703; Co-presence requires being within causal range, not mere simultaneous existence. — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 948; The fundamental relation between consciousnesses is conflict, not solidarity — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 1044 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Heidegger’s ontological being-with cannot explain concrete relations with particular others #complicates (0.85) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 703
• The fundamental relation between consciousnesses is conflict, not solidarity #contradicts (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 1044
• Co-presence requires being within causal range, not mere simultaneous existence. #complicates (0.75) — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 948