Hegelian synthesis uniquely requires mutual recognition of opposites, unlike Aristotle and Kant

Evidence

Philosophy, Hegel argues, will have had no other effect but that of precipitating the coming-to-be analytic of the synthesis (le devenir analytique de la synthèse). The principle of the prior unity of opposites has certainly always played a part in philosophy. But both the Aristotelian pair, δ.ναµις– ν0ργεια and the Kantian couple of a priori–a posteriori lack the moment of mutual recognition: where identity is retained within difference and difference preserved within identity. Synthesis remains an idea ‘which succeeding eras have to accomplish’. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 1192

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Defines what distinguishes Hegelian synthesis from prior dialectical pairs: mutual recognition is the added moment.
  • XREF: Directly seeds the reader’s plasticity concept — recognition-within-difference is the moving root of plastic dialectic. — connects to: Hegelian predication expresses mutual implication rather than attachment of one thing to another — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 1171; Hegel alone achieved consciousness of contradictions within a single system; Hegel makes being-for-others a necessary condition of being-for-itself — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 686 (+3 more)

Broader Connections