Hegel’s thought allegedly renounced all future by thinking time itself.

Evidence

More profoundly, Hegel’s thought would have assigned to itself this final fatefulness of fate, this very finality of the end and of what remains final, of which the only temporal determination is the ‘past’, what ‘has already passed away’. It is in this sense, simply because it has thought time itself, to have it in this manner thought about time, that Hegel’s thought would have, above all, renounced any future for itself as all future itself. This is, at least, the common belief or the widespread interpretation, in truth the accusation which Malabou re-interrogates and re-questions to submit it, first of all, to an intractable and obstinate trial. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 73

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the central accusation the whole book is built to refute: that Hegelian time is only the past.
• SEED: The irony — a philosophy supposedly of becoming stands accused of having no future — could anchor an essay on how misreadings become hegemonic.
• XREF: connects to: The vulgar sequential conception of time erases all possibility of a genuinely surprising future — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 77; Hegel’s end of history allows events but denies new universal meaning.; Heidegger reads Hegel’s silence on the future as time’s essence being past — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 79 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• The vulgar sequential conception of time erases all possibility of a genuinely surprising future #expands (0.85) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 77
• Hegel’s end of history allows events but denies new universal meaning. #expands (0.85)
• Heidegger reads Hegel’s silence on the future as time’s essence being past #expands (0.80) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 79
• Hegel remains a thinker of the future against current philosophical suspicion #qualifies (0.80)