Group-based control uses self-representative in-groups, unlike out-group support or compensation.

Evidence

It is important to distinguish group-based control through agentic in-groups from possible ways in which people may cope with lacking personal control by supporting out-groups. For instance, people may support groups they do not identify with as an effort of vicarious control when they expect these out-groups to act on behalf of their personal or their in-group’s goals (i.e., to serve as tools) or when they try to influence these out-groups to do so (Rothbaum et al., 1982). In a different vein, compensatory-control theory (Landau et al., 2015) assumes that people support social agents external to the self (e.g., out-groups) as a means to restore personal certainty after experiencing a loss of personal control. In contrast to these approaches, group-based control theory assumes that people gain a sense of control through identifying with an agentic group that is a representative of their self on a social level. — Immo Fritsche, Agency Through the We, 17

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clearly distinguishes group-based control theory from vicarious control and compensatory-control theory — a crisp boundary definition.
• XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s stated purpose: testing whether negational identities restore felt control through an in-group mechanism rather than mere out-group support. — connects to: In-group identification boosts well-being through gains in perceived control, not self-esteem. — Immo Fritsche, Agency Through the We: Group-Based…, 24

Broader Connections

• In-group identification boosts well-being through gains in perceived control, not self-esteem. #expands (0.85) — Immo Fritsche, Agency Through the We, 24