Grounded trust cannot be selectively aimed without criteria for selection

Evidence

Trust is a policy apt for conditions where knowledge is unavailable, as in the case of the free acts of another person (in Locke’s view) it will always remain. Trust does not have to be any more credulous or sentimental than the judgement of those who decide how to allocate it, though it will in practice, naturally, not be any less so either. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 1197 (#qualifies, via linked claim)

Admittedly, trust and distrust are, in the way in which complexity is reduced, confused in principle and oriented towards concrete persons or groups or the objects and events symbolizing their trustworthiness. That does not mean, however, that trust relationships cannot be restricted to specific aspects. One can trust someone in matters of love but not in money matters; one can trust his knowledge but not his skill, his moral intention but not his ability to report objectively, his taste but not his discretion. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 320 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Fine-grained discrimination of whom to trust limits the role of noncognitive trust.; Trust is a rational policy for conditions where knowledge is unavailable — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 1197; Trust relationships can be restricted to specific domains of competence — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 320

Broader Connections