God’s kenosis gives philosophic subjectivity its temporal form

Evidence

To give sustenance to these claims, we must show how, for Hegel, the same question is posed in two different and separate times. Whether the issue is the idea of kenosis, or the interpretation of the Aristotelian Prime Mover, one and the same project is preoccupying Hegel, that of plasticity, or, to put it another way, the ‘non-impassivity’ of the subject. The philosopher’s insistence on the unity of πσειν and νεργε!ν in Aristotle, just like his analysis of the movement of Entäußerung in the case of the God of Revelation, turns on the same project: how to characterize the subject as a structure of anticipation, and, by the same token, a structure of temporalization. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 918 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Sublating sensuous immediacy leaves God presented to knowledge as representation; Divine kenosis and reason’s inaccessible beyond are one and the same event — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 758; God creates the very temporality into which the Incarnation enters — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity,…, 866 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• Aristotle’s power-act unity and Christian kenosis both express the subject’s plastic temporalization #expands (0.90) — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 918
• Incarnation binds God and humanity in the shared experience of passing time #corroborates (0.85)
• Temporality is the necessary horizon for the for-itself’s transcendence #expands (0.80)