God’s incomprehensibility is a matter of order, not of knowledge’s limits

Evidence

When the different writers we have been looking at invoke the idea of the ‘incomprehensibility’ of God, they resist any implication of obscurity, obscurantism, or unintelligibility. They do not contrast what Hegel calls the ‘homely pictures of faith’ to speculative insight. They concentrate on what, in God, cannot be comprehended, what cannot be seized, possessed, or assimilated. Not because spirit – by some flaw, by some fallibility – is impotent to constitute the divine as object of knowledge, but because he is not simply a matter for knowledge. God is not a concept. — Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel, 744

Categorization

Category: Definitional Content

  • DEFINE: Distinguishes two senses of ‘incomprehensible’: something reason fails to grasp vs. something not of the order of reason at all.
  • XREF: Connects to the reader’s enmity question: whether the enemy likewise resists being an object of knowledge vs. exceeding knowledge’s order is a definitional split parallel to the passivity/agency ambiguity of plasticity.